April 21, 2014
Who are the First Responders?firstresponderscampaign.org
Inter­na­tion­al Med­ical Corps has 30 years’ expe­ri­ence respond­ing to the worst nat­ur­al dis­as­ters and con­flicts, pro­vid­ing life­sav­ing med­ical care and train­ing. Their approach has unlea …

Een campagne voor First Responders is altijd een goed initiatief om te delen!

Who are the First Responders?
firstresponderscampaign.org

Inter­na­tion­al Med­ical Corps has 30 years’ expe­ri­ence respond­ing to the worst nat­ur­al dis­as­ters and con­flicts, pro­vid­ing life­sav­ing med­ical care and train­ing. Their approach has unlea …

Een campagne voor First Responders is altijd een goed initiatief om te delen!

April 4, 2014
crisisgroup:

Fresh Thinking Needed on Cyprus | Hugh Pope and Scott Malcomson
A new round of talks has begun in Cyprus and the key parties seem eager to reach a settlement. However, the official goal — a bizonal, bicommunal federation — has stymied negotiators for decades. It is possible that the time has come to consider a mutually agreed separation, within the European Union, of the Greek and Turkish parts of the island.
The closest the two sides have come to an agreement on federal reunification was a decade ago under the Annan Plan, named after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. It built on decades of work and won the support of the UN, EU, United States, Turkey, and even Greece. Indeed, any federal deal will have to look pretty much like the one hammered out in those years of intense negotiations.
Yet the reality of public sentiment bit back. 76 percent of Greek Cypriots said no to this plan at referendum. As Annan wrote to the Security Council afterwards, “what was rejected was the [federal] solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.”
Today the two sides — whose infrastructure and administrative systems are almost completely separate — are, if anything, further apart. The numbers of people crossing the border have fallen, while polls show weakening support for a federal outcome. In 2004, the Turkish Cypriot side supported the Annan Plan with 65 percent of the vote. But in 2010, they firmly voted back to power a leader whose whole career has been dedicated to a two-state settlement. 
Miracles may happen — and there are many on the island who remain desperate for a settlement — but my judgment is that any federal deal will have an even tougher time succeeding now.
Fresh thinking is needed.The two sides should broaden the agenda alongside the well-worn process of UN-hosted talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators.
One idea that should be fully explored is what the terms might be if Greek Cypriots — the majority of the island’s population — were to offer Turkish Cypriots citizens full independence and fully support them to become members of the European Union. 
Such a deal would have to be agreed to by Greek Cypriots, voluntarily and through a referendum. This will be hard. Greek Cypriot public opinion still, in theory, absolutely rejects any partition. But even senior Greek Cypriot officials agree in private — especially around the dinner tables of business leaders seeking a way out of Cyprus’s crushing banking crisis of 2013 — that there is an increasingly urgent need for a new way forward for the economy and for society.
There is also a growing drumbeat of expert opinion urging Greek Cypriots to consider outcomes beyond the traditional federal goal, which has become so discredited that few on Cyprus are paying much attention to the new talks. International Crisis Group has just published Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality, while the U .S. Congressional Research Service concluded last year that “a ‘two-state’ solution seems to have become a more prominent part of the Turkish Cypriot/Turkey rhetoric and unless a dramatic breakthrough occurs early in the negotiations… that reality may gain more momentum.”
Polls show that key parts of what Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots really want can look surprisingly similar. The Greek Cypriots have long wanted a solution securely embedded in European values and structures. That is what Turkish Cypriots say they want too: to become part of the European Union, not part of Turkey, even if they do wish that, in extremis, Turkey would protect their small community. The European part is crucial.
This can only happen with voluntary Greek Cypriot agreement, something that will have to be persuasively won by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. They will need to offer convincing terms: withdraw all or almost all of Turkey’s 30,000 troops on the island; end the demand to continue the 1960s “guarantorship” so hated by Greek Cypriots; guarantee compensation of Greek Cypriots for the two-thirds of private property in the north that is owned by them; return the ghost resort of Varosha to its original owners; and pull back to hold 29 percent or less of the island. 
After what will necessarily be a multi-year transition, this will also produce the European solution that Greek Cypriots so often say they want. The two sides will share the same basic legal norms and regulations, the same currency, and the same visa regime. Secure and confident in their new sovereign rights, the Turkish Cypriot side will likely waive the un-European demand for “derogations,” or limits on property purchases by Greek Cypriots in the new entity. 
Nobody is completely right on Cyprus: all parties share responsibility for the frozen conflict on the island. At the end of the day, an independent Turkish Cypriot state within the EU is not rewarding one side or another. Europe will doubtless flinch at accepting a small new Turkish, Muslim state in its midst. 
But Europe helped create this situation, since Brussels breaking its own rules contributed to the clumsy 2004 accession of the disunited island to the EU. 
Moreover, at least 100,000 of the 170,000 Turkish Cypriots are already EU citizens through their Republic of Cyprus passports.
Europe will also be among those who gain from resolving a dispute that has for four decades burdened so many local and regional processes, not least the long-hamstrung relationship between the EU and NATO, and the new question of how the countries of the East Mediterranean can most quickly, profitably and safely exploit new offshore natural gas reserves. This is not partition: it is reunifying Cyprus within the EU.
crisisgroup.org
Photo: UN Geneva/Flickr

Fascinerend dit vergeten bevroren conflict op Cyprus. Nooit geweten dat de meerderheid van de Turks Cyprioten een paspoort van de Grieks Cypriotische Republiek Cyprus hebben.

crisisgroup:

Fresh Thinking Needed on Cyprus | Hugh Pope and Scott Malcomson

A new round of talks has begun in Cyprus and the key parties seem eager to reach a settlement. However, the official goal — a bizonal, bicommunal federation — has stymied negotiators for decades. It is possible that the time has come to consider a mutually agreed separation, within the European Union, of the Greek and Turkish parts of the island.

The closest the two sides have come to an agreement on federal reunification was a decade ago under the Annan Plan, named after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. It built on decades of work and won the support of the UN, EU, United States, Turkey, and even Greece. Indeed, any federal deal will have to look pretty much like the one hammered out in those years of intense negotiations.

Yet the reality of public sentiment bit back. 76 percent of Greek Cypriots said no to this plan at referendum. As Annan wrote to the Security Council afterwards, “what was rejected was the [federal] solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.”

Today the two sides — whose infrastructure and administrative systems are almost completely separate — are, if anything, further apart. The numbers of people crossing the border have fallen, while polls show weakening support for a federal outcome. In 2004, the Turkish Cypriot side supported the Annan Plan with 65 percent of the vote. But in 2010, they firmly voted back to power a leader whose whole career has been dedicated to a two-state settlement. 

Miracles may happen — and there are many on the island who remain desperate for a settlement — but my judgment is that any federal deal will have an even tougher time succeeding now.

Fresh thinking is needed.The two sides should broaden the agenda alongside the well-worn process of UN-hosted talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators.

One idea that should be fully explored is what the terms might be if Greek Cypriots — the majority of the island’s population — were to offer Turkish Cypriots citizens full independence and fully support them to become members of the European Union. 

Such a deal would have to be agreed to by Greek Cypriots, voluntarily and through a referendum. This will be hard. Greek Cypriot public opinion still, in theory, absolutely rejects any partition. But even senior Greek Cypriot officials agree in private — especially around the dinner tables of business leaders seeking a way out of Cyprus’s crushing banking crisis of 2013 — that there is an increasingly urgent need for a new way forward for the economy and for society.

There is also a growing drumbeat of expert opinion urging Greek Cypriots to consider outcomes beyond the traditional federal goal, which has become so discredited that few on Cyprus are paying much attention to the new talks. International Crisis Group has just published Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality, while the U .S. Congressional Research Service concluded last year that “a ‘two-state’ solution seems to have become a more prominent part of the Turkish Cypriot/Turkey rhetoric and unless a dramatic breakthrough occurs early in the negotiations… that reality may gain more momentum.”

Polls show that key parts of what Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots really want can look surprisingly similar. The Greek Cypriots have long wanted a solution securely embedded in European values and structures. That is what Turkish Cypriots say they want too: to become part of the European Union, not part of Turkey, even if they do wish that, in extremis, Turkey would protect their small community. The European part is crucial.

This can only happen with voluntary Greek Cypriot agreement, something that will have to be persuasively won by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. They will need to offer convincing terms: withdraw all or almost all of Turkey’s 30,000 troops on the island; end the demand to continue the 1960s “guarantorship” so hated by Greek Cypriots; guarantee compensation of Greek Cypriots for the two-thirds of private property in the north that is owned by them; return the ghost resort of Varosha to its original owners; and pull back to hold 29 percent or less of the island. 

After what will necessarily be a multi-year transition, this will also produce the European solution that Greek Cypriots so often say they want. The two sides will share the same basic legal norms and regulations, the same currency, and the same visa regime. Secure and confident in their new sovereign rights, the Turkish Cypriot side will likely waive the un-European demand for “derogations,” or limits on property purchases by Greek Cypriots in the new entity. 

Nobody is completely right on Cyprus: all parties share responsibility for the frozen conflict on the island. At the end of the day, an independent Turkish Cypriot state within the EU is not rewarding one side or another. Europe will doubtless flinch at accepting a small new Turkish, Muslim state in its midst. 

But Europe helped create this situation, since Brussels breaking its own rules contributed to the clumsy 2004 accession of the disunited island to the EU. 

Moreover, at least 100,000 of the 170,000 Turkish Cypriots are already EU citizens through their Republic of Cyprus passports.

Europe will also be among those who gain from resolving a dispute that has for four decades burdened so many local and regional processes, not least the long-hamstrung relationship between the EU and NATO, and the new question of how the countries of the East Mediterranean can most quickly, profitably and safely exploit new offshore natural gas reserves. This is not partition: it is reunifying Cyprus within the EU.

crisisgroup.org

Photo: UN Geneva/Flickr

Fascinerend dit vergeten bevroren conflict op Cyprus. Nooit geweten dat de meerderheid van de Turks Cyprioten een paspoort van de Grieks Cypriotische Republiek Cyprus hebben.

April 4, 2014
Gemeenten onderhandelen over XP

nos.nl

De vijf grootste Nederlandse gemeenten onderhandelen nog steeds met softwarebedrijf Microsoft over de ondersteuning voor computers met het besturingssysteem Windows XP.De tijd begint te dringen: komende dinsdag brengt Microsoft geen…

Het is zo slecht, als je al jaren had kunnen weten dat Windows XP vanaf april 2014 niet meer ondersteunt zou worden door Microsoft, dat je tot het laatste moment nog niet klaar bent. Bij m’n vorige werkgever waren hadden we het 2009 al over de planning voor de migratie van XP naar (toen nog Vista of direct naar Windows 7). Toentertijd hadden de IT afdelingen van overheden dus ook al kunnen weten dat Microsoft per april 2014 zou stoppen met de ondersteuning van Windows XP. Dat ze 5 jaar later nog niet gemigreerd zijn, vind ik echt te laks.

April 1, 2014
Marokkaanse criminelen bestaan niet

rechtbankverslaggever, journalistklomp.com

In Nederland leven Marokkanen. En criminelen. Sommige criminelen zijn van Marokkaanse afkomst. Maar wat hebben die twee eigenlijk met elkaar te maken? Marokkaanse criminelen bestaan niet. There. I said it. Horden deskundigen buigen zich dagelijks…

Goed artikel, dat is wat ik tegen sommigen al eerder heb gezegd. Men is niet crimineel omdat ze van een bepaalde cultuur zijn. Iemand is crimineel omdat hij/zij tot de sociale onderklasse hoort en niet mee kan komen!

April 1, 2014
Jong Talent

rodekruis.nl

​​​​Vier jaar geleden haalde het Rode Kruis alle kranten met het volgende bericht: "Het Rode Kruis zoekt bestuursleden met strakke huid". Voor het eerst in de geschiedenis kregen jongeren een actieve s …

@RodeKruis zoekt een nieuw landelijk jong bestuurslid. Ben jij, of ken jij, iemand die tussen de 18 en 25 jaar is en graag zowel bestuurlijke ervaring wilt opdoen als werken binnen één van de (zo niet dé) meest inspirerende goede doelen van Nederland? Lees dan verder of stuur dit bericht door!

April 1, 2014
Telefoon voor C. Leeuwyoutube.com

1 april, het dolfinarium is er klaar voor!

Telefoon voor C. Leeuw
youtube.com

1 april, het dolfinarium is er klaar voor!

March 31, 2014
Ons nieuwste promoteamlid doet een schokkende ontdekking. Wat zou jij in zijn plaats doen?

We gaan het vanavond behandelen in de les! Ben jij voorbereid op een calamiteit? (bij Rode kruis Apeldoorn)

Ons nieuwste promoteamlid doet een schokkende ontdekking. Wat zou jij in zijn plaats doen?

We gaan het vanavond behandelen in de les! Ben jij voorbereid op een calamiteit? (bij Rode kruis Apeldoorn)

March 30, 2014
Doe geen aangifte tegen Wilders, dat is hypocriet
Door Zihni Özdil en Matthijs Rooduijn, nrc.nl
‘De Marokkanen die niet willen deugen, moet je vernederen, voor de ogen van hun eigen mensen.” In 2008 deed de nog onbekende PvdA-politicus Hans Spekman deze uitspraak, en ik noemde dat een racistisch …

Ter aanvulling op de vorige post. Nog één over het racisme dat leeft onder meer politici en het “elitaire” deel van de bevolking!

Doe geen aangifte tegen Wilders, dat is hypocriet
Door Zihni Özdil en Matthijs Rooduijn, nrc.nl

‘De Marokkanen die niet willen deugen, moet je vernederen, voor de ogen van hun eigen mensen.” In 2008 deed de nog onbekende PvdA-politicus Hans Spekman deze uitspraak, en ik noemde dat een racistisch …

Ter aanvulling op de vorige post. Nog één over het racisme dat leeft onder meer politici en het “elitaire” deel van de bevolking!

March 30, 2014
Saul van Stapele

medium.com

Bijzonder goede verwoording van, en aanklacht tegen, het onderhuids racisme dat bij wellicht de meerderheid van de Nederlandse (blanke) samenleving heerst

March 30, 2014
Russische ex-minister zegt dat Putin ook Finland wil annexeren, zijn we voorbereid?

luxzenburg.org

Is Putin erop uit om het Russische rijk te herstellen, inclusief Finland? Of stopt de gekte bij de Krim? In hoeverre mogen de Europese landen zich veilig wanen met hun kleine mini-legers en een terugtrekkende Verenigde Staten?

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